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A review of Maltese Administrative Law cases does not re­
veal anything like a plethora of cases where the central issue 
is the failure of the public authorities to 'keep their word'. 
Such cases are, for some reason which I will not venture to 
discover in this article, rather hard to come by. 
This is not to say that such issues are unknown to our 
Courts. 
Over the years our Courts have in fact been called upon to 
decide disputes relating to the unilateral changing of street lev­
els, 1 the refusal to respect a contractual right to use a theatre on 
alleged grounds of public order,2 the unwelcome amendment 
or revocation of building permits3 or driving licenses,4 and a 
number of disputes as to the binding implications of particular 
authorizations especially in the field of import licensing.5
On some occasions our Courts have tended to approach 
these issues from the point of view of the application of 'prin­
ciples of justice'6 but they have also favoured an adaptation
of the law of contract involving the reading of implied con­
tractual obligations into administrative authorizations or de­
cisions communicated to third parties and holding that the 
Administration is obliged to respect such implied agreements 
or pay damages in default. 
It is noteworthy that in the Francesco Camilleri v. Loren­
za Gatt noe 7 decision, a case about the alteration of street lev­
els, the Court decided the issue on the basis of French and 
Italian writings and judgements and made reference both to 
the notion of a tacit 'contract' between the public authorities 
and the owners of property abutting on a public street and 
to the legitimate expectation (legittima speranza) which the 
construction of a public street at a certain level gives rise to. 
The following extract from that judgement is of partic-
ular interest: 
Atteso che nel silenzio di una legge che impone tale obbligo, 
questo si potrebbe bene desumere da un' accordo tacito che 
interviene tra il governo ed i privati, quando ilprimo, aprendo 
una strada, permette a questi ultimi d '  innalzare le loro cos­
truzioni lungo la stessa, aprirvi porte e finestre e scaricarvi 
le acque piovane; per cui eglino nutrono la legitima speran­
za di non essere disturbati nel godimento. 
It is also significant that in the same judgement the Court set 
aside the position expressed in a British judgement to the 
effect that the change in road levels would only give rise to 
the payment of compensation if it were undertaken 'wrong­
fully, arbitrarily, negligently and oppressively'. The reason 
given in the judgement is that the particular British decision 
was 'apparently' based on a specific law (ma tale decisione
sembra basata su uno statuto speciale, ivi citato). 
This approach, based on notions of justice and an adapta­
tion of the law of contract, has over the years provided protec­
tion against some arbitrary or over zealous decisions by the Ad­
ministration but one problematic aspect of applying a 'con­
tract' test rather than a 'fairness' test in public law is that the 
notion of contract becomes one of doubtful assistance where 
specific rights cannot be read into the position of the plaintiff, 
such as in the case of exercise of powers of a 'prerogative' na­
ture,8 or where the effects of a change in the Administration's 
2 
3 
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Civil Court First Hall, (Vol. XVIII, ii.171, 17th May 1902) per Mr Justice G. Pullicino.
I n  English common law the exercise of prerogative powers has been subject to judicial review since R. v. Criminal Injuries Compen­
sation Board, ex parte Lain, [1967], 2 QB 864.
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policies are unfair without being in breach of such 'rights' of 
third parties. 
The private law notion of contract may indeed match un­
easily in a number of public law relationships where there is 
in fact no real 'contract' to be found or implied and where 
the private person's right may not extend to the conferment 
of a benefit but may be limited to a right to a hearing before 
a change of policy is implemented. 
It is also relevant that the classification of acts of the 
Administration as 'contracts' with those effected by them 
may tend towards denying the flexibility required for the 
governance of a State in an increasingly demanding and 
rapidly changing national and international environment. 
Such changes may often lead to situations, which are not 
uncommon, where public authorities find themselves unable 
to deliver on the promises which they had made. This is not 
necessarily the result of any policy intended, as Francis Bacon, 
rather cynically, remarked many centuries ago, to 'hold men's 
hearts by hopes when it can not by satisfaction' but, as Lord 
Justice Schiemann noted in a recent England and Wales Court 
of Appeal decision,9 such a breach of promise may be due to
circumstances where 
Seen from the point of view of administrators focusing on the 
problem immediately before their eyes a promise seems rea­
sonable or will at least reduce the need to worry further in the 
immediate future about the promisee. But when they, or their 
superiors, focus on a wider background it appears that the mak­
ing of the promise was unwise or that, in any event, its fulfil­
ment seems too difficult. 
This is not to say that lack of proper foresight is acceptable, 
but one cannot ignore the fact that it is nevertheless a practi­
cally unavoidable reality where administrators are called upon 
to take decisions in an environment where problems are in­
creasingly multifarious and their solutions subject to various 
legal, political, international and budgetary constraints which 
are subject to rapid change. 
It is also of the essence of the democratic system that the 
Administration must be able to retain flexibility in decisions 
about the use and allocation of resources and a legal system 
based on an implied obligation to perpetuate the 'status quo' 
is bound to run into conflict with the essentials of democra­
cy, not to mention the economic interests of the country as a 
whole. 
The Administration's flexibility requirements however 
still have to co-exist with the private person's right to the 
protection of the certainty of the law and a suitable balance 
has therefore to be sought between the Administration's need 
to be able to change and adapt its policies and the private 
person's right to protection against capricious or conspicu­
ously unfair policy changes often resulting from bad admin­
istration. 
Ensuring Fairness 
The doctrine of 'legitimate expectation' is intended to protect 
private persons against capricious changes in the Administra­
tion's policies which although being 'legal' in that they do not 
go against any express provision of the law, are nevertheless 
unfair in that they imply a breach of promise amounting to 
an abuse of power. The concept of 'legitimate expectation' im­
plies that, subject to statute, if a policy or a decision is made 
which confers a benefit then that policy will not be changed 
without granting the person concerned a reasonable oppor­
tunity to make representations and, where the expectation re­
lates to a substantive benefit, without giving due consideration 
to the promise which was made and to the effects of failing 
to honour it for reasons of public interest. 
The rule that a public authority should not frustrate a per­
son's legitimate expectation is, in fact, an aspect of the rule 
that a public authority must act fairly and reasonably. As stat­
ed above, the rule operates both with regard to procedural 
rights and with regard to substantive rights and it draws upon 
the principle of good administration which prima facie requires 
public authorities to adhere to their promises. 
As stated in the England and Wales Court of Appeal de­
cision in R. v. North and East Devon Health Authority ex 
parte Pamela Coughlan and Secretary of State for Health, 
Intervenor and Royal College of Nursing, lntervenor,1° 
The court's task in all these cases is not to impede executive 
activity but to reconcile its continuing need to initiate or re­
spond to change with the legitimate interests or expectations 
of citizens or strangers who have relied, and have been justi­
fied in relying, on a current policy or an extant promise. 
As a result of the need to protect the individual against un­
fair treatment the doctrine of legitimate expectation has been 
developed and expounded upon in various common law ju­
risdictions in a manner which Mr Justice Kelly sitting in the 
High Court of Ireland in the case of Glencar Exploration PLC 
v. Mayo County Council11 even described as not being eas­
ily reconcilable with one another.
Protecting 'Legitinuite Expectations' 
In English Law the doctrine of 'legitimate expectation' was 
first expounded by Lord Denning in the case of Schmidt v. 
Secretary of State for Home Affairs12 in 1969.
9 London Borough of Newham and Manik Bibi andAtayaAl-Nashed, R. v. [2001] EWCA, Civ 607, (26th April 2001).
10 [1999] EWCA Civ (16 July 1999).
11 [1998] IEHC 137 (20 August 1998). 
12 (1969) 2 Ch 149 at 170-71. 
4 lo-DRITT 2002. 
That case concerned the decision of the Secretary of State 
for Home Affairs not to grant a number of foreign students the 
right to stay in the United Kingdom for the purpose of con­
tinuing their studies without granting the students a hearing. 
In that case although the application was turned down since 
the students did not have a right to stay one day more than 
what was originally permitted, Lord Denning stated that if a 
person had a right, interest or legitimate expectation he could 
claim a right to be heard whenever a public authority has by 
promise or by conduct created a 'legitimate expectation' that 
a hearing will be given. 
In practice, the theory extends the protection granted by 
the rules of natural justice to legitimate expectations ( as dis­
tinct from rights) of persons affected by the exercise of power 
by the Administration. As devised by Lord Denning it was 
a device that permitted the Courts to invalidate decisions made 
without hearing a person who had a reasonable expectation, 
but no legal right, to the continuation of a benefit, privilege or 
state of affairs. It therefore helped to protect a person from the 
disappointment and often the injustice, that arises from the 
unexpected termination by a government official of a state of 
affairs that otherwise seemed likely to continue.13
The Irish Courts had apparently not applied the doctrine until 
1988 when Chief Justice Findlay presiding over the Supreme 
Court of Ireland in the case of Webb v. Jreland14 stated that 
It would appear that the doctrine of 'legitimate expectation', some­
times described as 'reasonable expectation', has not in those terms 
been the subject matter of any decisions of our Courts. However, 
the doctrine connoted by such expressions is but an aspect of the 
well recognized concept of promissory estoppel ( which has been 
frequently applied in our Courts), whereby a promise or repre­
sentation as to intention may in certain circumstances be held 
binding on the representor or promissor. The nature and extent of 
that doctrine in circumstances such as those of this case has been 
expressed as follows by Lord Denning MR in Amalgamated 
Property Company v. Texas Bank, [1982), QB84, 122: 
'Where the parties to a transaction proceed on the basis of 
an underlying assumption - either of law or of fact - whether 
due to misrepresentation or mistake makes no difference - on 
which they have conducted the dealings between them - nei­
ther of them will be allowed to go back on that assumption 
when it would be unfair or unjust to allow him to do so. If one 
of them does seek to go back on it, the Courts will give the 
other such remedy as the equity of the case demands'. 
In a 1993 case, before the High Court of Ireland,15 Costello
J. after reviewing various authorities in the United Kingdom
and in Australia defined the practical effects of the doctrine
of legitimate expectation in Ireland as follows:
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I can summarize the legal principles which I think are to be 
derived from the authorities to which I have referred and which 
are relevant for the purposes of this case as follows: 
1. There is a duty on a Minister who is exercising a discre­
tionary power which may affect rights or interests to adopt
fair procedures in the exercise of the power. Where a mem­
ber of the public has a legitimate expectation arising from
the Minister's works and/or conduct that
(a) he will be given a hearing before a decision adverse to
his interests will be taken, or
(b) that he will obtain a benefit from the exercise of the
power, then the Minister also has a duty to act fairly towards
him and this may involve a duty to give him a fair hearing
before a decision adverse to his interests is taken. There
would then arise a correlative right to a fair hearing which,
if denied, will justify the Court in quashing the decision.
2. The existence of a legitimate expectation that a benefit will
be conferred does not in itself give rise to any legal or eq­
uitable right to the benefit itself which can be enforced by
an Order of Mandamus or otherwise. However, in cases
involving public authorities, other than cases involving
the exercise of statutory discretionary powers, an equitable
right to the benefit may arise from the application of the prin­
ciples of promissory estoppel to which effect will be given
by appropriate Court order.
3. In cases involving the exercise of a discretionary statutory
. power, the only legitimate expectation relating to the con­
ferring of a benefit that can be inferred from words or con­
duct is a conditional one, namely, that a benefit will be con­
ferred provided that at the time the Minister considers that
it is a proper exercise of the statutory power in the light of
current policy to grant it. Such a conditional expectation can­
not give rise to an enforceable right to the benefit should
it later be refused by the Minister in the public interest.
4. In cases involving the exercise of a discretionary statutory
power in which an explicit assurance has been given which
gives rise to an expectation that a benefit will be conferred
no enforceable equitable or legal right to the benefit can
arise. No promissory estoppel can arise because the Minis­
ter cannot estop either himself or his successors from ex­
ercising a discretionary power in the manner prescribed
by Parliament at the time it is being exercised.
The Main Issues in Litigation 
How do the Courts go about determining 'legitimate expec­
tation' cases? 
In the recent England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil 
Division) decision in the case of London Borough of Newham 
13 
As per McHugh J., High Court of Australia in Minister of State for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v.Ah Hin Teoh, (1995) 128ALR 353. 
14 [1988] IR 353. 
15 
Tara Prospecting Limited and Another v. Minister for Energy, Ireland and the Attorney General, [1993), ILRM 771. 
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And Manik Bibi And Ataya Al-Nashed, R. v. 16 Lord Justice
Schiemann, Lord Justice Sedley and Mr Justice Blackbume 
define the questions to be asked and answered in the deter­
mination of such cases as the following: 
In all 'legitimate expectation' cases, whether substantive or 
procedural, three practical questions arise. The first question 
is to what has the public authority, whether by practice or by 
promise, committed itself; the second is whether the authority 
has acted or proposes to act unlawfully in relation to its com­
mitment; the third is what the court should do. 
The Court then went on to define the first question ('To 
what has the public authority committed itself?') as a question 
of analyzing the evidence in order to determine whether the 
public authority has said or done anything which can legit­
imately be considered to have generated an expectation. If 
it results that no expectation was 'legitimately' generated, 
as would probably be the case when a promise was made 
without lawful authority, the case would stop there. 
Finding answers to the second and third questions ('Wheth­
er the authority has acted or proposes to act unlawfully in rela­
tion to its commitment?' and 'What should the Court do?') is a 
more complicated matter involving the definition of the 'mea­
suring rods' to be used in order to define whether a certain 
course of action constitutes an abuse of power and the defini­
tion of the judicial reaction once such abuse is identified. 
As Professor Craig states in his Administrative Law17 there
are often tensions between several values in these cases and 
one often has to decide which good to attain and which 
good to forego. There are, on one hand, administrative and 
democratic gains in allowing the Administration the flexi­
bility of coming to different conclusions about the allocation 
of its resources in the future whilst on the other hand there 
is value in holding the Administration to the promises which 
it made, thereby encouraging responsible public adminis­
tration and allowing people to plan their lives sensibly. 
It is therefore very difficult to come to wide-ranging for­
mulations applicable to all cases in determining whether the 
Administration has acted unlawfully 
As stated by the England and Wales Court of Appeal in the 
quoted Newham 18 decision:
history shows that wide-ranging formulations, while capable 
of producing a just result in the individual case, are seen later 
16 [2001] EWCA Civ flJ7 (261h April, 2001). 
17 P. P. Craig, Administrative Law, 4e. Ch. 19.
18 At 7 above. 
to have needlessly constricted the development of the law. Thus 
it was the view of this court in Coughlan 19 that a principle, 
apparently earlier embraced by this court in R. v. Secretary of 
State for the Home Department, ex parte Hargreaves ,20 to the 
effect that the court would only enforce expectations as to pro­
cedure as opposed to expectations of a substantive benefit, was 
wrongly framed. 
One question which often arises is that as to whether a plain­
tiff must prove that he or she has relied upon a promise in 
order to be able to demand judicial review on the grounds 
of breach of a legitimate expectation. 
In the England and Wales Court of Appeal decision of 
R. v. Secretary of State for Education and Employment, ex
parte Heather Charis Begbie2 1 it was held that reliance, though
potentially relevant in most cases, is not essential. However,
Mr. Justice Peter Gibson, giving the leading judgement, also
stated that:
it would be wrong to understate the significance of reliance in 
this area of the law. It is very much the exception, rather than the 
rule, that detrimental reliance will not be present when the court 
finds unfairness in the defeating of a legitimate expectation. 
This is also broadly in agreement with what Professor Craig 
has proposed in this regard in his Administrative Law22 
Detrimental reliance will normally be required in order for the 
claimant to show that it would be unlawful to go back on a 
representation. This is in accord with policy, since if the in­
dividual has suffered no hardship there is no reason based on 
legal certainty to hold the agency to its representation. It should 
not, however, be necessary to show any monetary loss, or any­
thing equivalent thereto. 
Professor Craig however also gives the following example 
of a case where reliance is not essential: 
Where an agency seeks to depart from an established policy 
in relation to a particular person, detrimental reliance should 
not be required. Consistency of treatment and equality are at 
stake in such cases, and these values should be protected ir­
respective of whether there has been any reliance as such. 
The case of R. (On the application ofZeqiri) v. Secretary of 
State for the Home Department23 is a good illustration of ref­
erence to 'detrimental reliance' in 'legitimate expectation' 
cases. It was an immigration case filed by a Kosovar seek­
ing asylum in the United Kingdom which had been pending 
19 R v. North and East Devon Health Authority, ex parte Pamela Coughlan and Secretary of State for Health, Intervenor and Royal Col-
lege of Nursing, Intervenor, [1999], EWCA, Civ (16th July 1999). 
20 [1997], 1 W. L. R. 906. 
21 2000, 1, W. L. R. 1115. 
22 As at 14 above p. 619. 
23 [2001],All ER (D) 121 (Mar) (Lord Phillips, MR, Kennedy and Dyson, LJJ). 
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a final decision in another test case24 which was destined
for the House of Lords. The issue in the test case was iden­
tical to that in Zeqiri, namely, whether the applicant's claim 
for asylum should be decided in the United Kingdom or in 
Germany. It was assumed all along that if it was held in the 
test case that the claim should be decided in the United King­
dom then the same result would follow in Zeqiri. Eventually 
when the decision was given in the test case it was decided 
that the application for asylum should be decided in the Unit­
ed Kingdom. The Secretary of State submitted, however, that, 
by reason of a change of circumstances in Germany, it was 
open to him to proceed on the basis that Zeqiri's claim for 
asylum should be determined in Germany. The England and 
Wales Court of Appeal however held that to be unfair in the 
circumstances of that case. It seems that the court proceeded 
on the basis that Zeqiri had a 'legitimate expectation' to the 
effect that, in circumstances similar to those of the test case, 
his application for asylum would be determined in the United 
Kingdom and concluded that change of position or reliance 
on the part of Zeqiri did not need to be shown. The Master 
of the Rolls delivering the substantive judgement said: 
Mr Gill25 submitted that the period that the appellant spent 'in 
limbo', awaiting the progression of [the test case] to the House 
of Lords has involved further hardship. The prolonged peri­
od of uncertainty as to his fate will have caused him mental 
stress and he will have been forced to subsist without the ben­
efits of those whose claim to asylum has been recognized ... I 
consider that this hardship is material to the question of whether 
it would now be fair for the Secretary of State to remove the 
appellant to Germany on the basis that the decision for which 
he has been waiting is of no relevance to his case. It is unfair 
for the Secretary of State to change tack at this late stage.26 
This decision was reversed by virtue of a House of Lords 
judgement of the 24 January 200227 on the basis of a dis­
agreement as to whether a 'legitimate expectation' had in fact 
been created to the effect that following the decision of the 
Court of Appeal, Mr Zeqiri 's application for asylum would be 
considered on its merits. 
The following passage from the House of Lords judge­
ment illustrates the point made by that Court and throws fur­
ther light on the application of the 'legitimate expectation' doc­
trine: 
44. It is well established that conduct by an officer of state
equivalent to a breach of contract or breach of representation
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may be an abuse of power for which judicial review is the ap­
propriate remedy: see Lord Templeman in R. v. ln/and Revenue
Commissioners, Exp Preston, [ 1985] AC 835, 866-867. This 
particular form of the more general concept of abuse of power 
has been characterized as the denial of a legitimate expectation. 
In considering the expectations which may legitimately arise 
from statements to taxpayers by the Inland Revenue, Bing­
ham Ll said that they must be 'clear, unambiguous and de­
void of relevant qualification': see R. v. lnland Revenue Com­
missioners, Ex, p MFK Underwriting Agents Ltd., [1990] I WLR
1545, 1569G. Mr Gill said that while it might be appropriate 
in the case of dealings between the Revenue and sophisticated 
tax advisers to insist upon a high degree of clarity in the al­
leged representation, this need not necessarily be required in 
other cases. Kosovar refugees cannot be expected to check the 
small print. In principle I agree that an alleged representation 
must be construed in the context in which it is made. The ques­
tion is not whether it would have founded an estoppel in pri­
vate law but the broader question of whether, as Simon Brown 
Ll said in R. v. lnland Revenue Commissioners, Exp Unilever
PLC, [ 1996] STC 681, 695B, a public authority acting contrary 
to the representation would be acting 'with conspicuous unfair­
ness' and in that sense abusing its power. 
45. In the present case what is relied upon is not a represen­
tation directly to the applicants but one which is said to arise
out of the conduct of adversarial litigation and was made to the
applicant's legal representatives. The question is therefore what
would have been understood by a lawyer rather than an un­
aided Kosovar refugee.'
As has already been stated a central issue to be examined in 
cases based on the alleged breach of a 'legitimate expecta­
tion' is that as to whether in going back on its promise the 
Administration has acted in a manner 'so unfair as to amount 
to an abuse of power' .28 In this regard, although it is not the
case that each unfulfilled promise constitutes an abuse of 
power, when the Administration adopts a course of action in 
breach of a previous promise without even considering the 
breach of the promise as being a relevant consideration the 
decision would amount to such an abuse of power.29 
Seeking the Appropriate Reaction 
The third and last question, regarding the appropriate judi­
cial reaction once the Court finds that a breach of a legiti­
mate expectation amounted to an abuse of power, raises the 
24 
R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Besnik Gashi, [1999], INLR 276. 
25 Counsel to the applicant. 
26 
In paragraph 68 of the judgment. 
27 
[2002], UKHL 3. 
28 
Vide R. v. lnland Revenue Commissioners ex parte Unilever, [1996] S. T. C. 681. 
29 
Vide also Coughlan decision quoted at 16 above. 
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problem as to whether the Court can order the fulfilment of 
the promise (as in the case of a breach of contract) or whether 
it may simply annul the administrative decision in question 
and send the matter back to the public authority concerned for 
reconsideration. 
In the United Kingdom it would appear that the general 
rule in Administrative Law cases is that the Courts will not 
order specific petformance where to do so would be to assume 
functions constitutionally vested in the Executive. This is also 
the position which appears to result from the wording of ar­
ticle 469A of the Maltese Code of Organization and Civil 
Procedure which regulates judicial review.30
One particularly strong argument in favour of reference 
for reconsideration rather than ordering specific petformance 
is that based on the fact that in considering judicial review 
cases the Court often concentrates on particular aspects re­
lating to the legality of the decision and in so doing it usual­
ly has before it only part of the relevant material upon which 
the decision on the merits is made. 
As Lord Bingham said in R. v. Cambridge Health Author-
ity, ex parte B:31 
.. .it would be totally unrealistic to require the authority to come 
to the court with its accounts and seek to demonstrate that if 
this treatment were provided for B then there would be a pa­
tient, C, who would have to go without treatment. No major 
authority could run its financial affairs in a way which would 
permit such a demonstration. 
In the Newham32 decision, which was about entitlement to
public housing, it was held by the Court that: 
In an area such as the provision of housing at public expense 
where decisions are informed by social and political value 
judgements as to priorities of expenditure the court will start 
with a recognition that such invidious choices are essentially 
political rather than judicial. In our judgement the appropri­
ate body to make that choice in the context of the present case 
is the authority. However, it must do so in the light of the 'le­
gitimate expectations' of the respondents. 
The Australian decision of Minister of State for Immigration 
and Ethnic Affairs v. Ah Hin Teoh,33 also discusses the extent to
which one can demand that a legitimate expectation be fulfilled: 
The existence of a legitimate expectation that a decision-maker 
will act in a particular way does not necessarily compel him or 
her to act in that way. 
That is the difference between a legitimate expectation and 
a binding rule of law. To regard a legitimate expectation as 
requiring the decision-maker to act in a particular way is tan­
tamount to treating it as a rule of law ... But, if a decision-maker 
proposes to make a decision inconsistent with a legitimate ex­
pectation, procedural fairness requires that the persons affect­
ed should be given notice and an adequate opportunity of pre­
senting a case against the taking of such a course. 
These dicta demonstrate that although there are cases, most­
ly in the field of legitimate expectations to substantive ben­
efits, where there can only be one lawful answer to the ques­
tion whether the Administration should be obliged to hon­
our its promise, it would be very risky to assume that this will 
always be the case. 
International Treaties 
The Australian decision in Teoh is particularly important with 
regard to the question as to whether an international treaty 
to which the State is a party but which has not yet been incor­
porated into national law can give rise to a 'legitimate ex­
pectation' to the effect that the Executive will take the pro­
visions of the Treaty into consideration in the execution of 
its functions. 
As is the case in Malta34 the provisions of an interna­
tional treaty to which Australia is a party do not form part of 
Australian law unless those provisions have been incorporat­
ed into national law. This principle has its foundation in the 
proposition that in the Australian constitutional system the 
making and ratification of treaties fall within the province of 
the Executive in the exercise of its prerogative power where­
as the making and the alteration of the law falls within the 
province of Parliament, not the Executive. So, a treaty which 
has not been incorporated into Australian municipal law can­
not operate as a direct source of individual rights and obliga­
tions under that law. This is also substantively the position 
emerging from Malta's Ratification of Treaties Act.35
Nevertheless, the High Court of Australia held that: 
30 
The wording of Article 469A only entitles the Court to 'enquire into the validity of any administrative act or declare such act null, invalid 
or without effect'. 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
8 
[1995], 2 All E. R. 129. 
As at 7 above. 
As at 10 above. 
Vide Ratification of Treaties Act, 1983 (Cap 304). The cases cited in Teoh in support of this are Chow Hung Ching v. The King, (1948), 
77 CLR 449 at 478; Bradley v. The Commonwealth, (1973), 128 CLR 557 at 582; Simsek v. Macphee, (1982), 148 CLR 636 at 641-
642; Koowarta v. Bjelke-Petersen, (1982), 153 CLR 168 at 211-212, 224-225; Kioa v. West, (1985), 159 CLR 550 at 570; Dietrich v. 
The Queen, (1992), 177 CLR 292 at 305; J. H. Rayner Ltd. v. Dept. of Trade, (1990), 2 AC 418 at 500. The position also corresponds 
with that in the Unitd Kingdom at common law vide Thakrar v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, (1974), 2 All E. R. 261 
1983, Cap 304 Laws of Malta. 
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by ratifying the Convention36 Australia has given a solemn un­
dertaking to the world at large that it will: 'in all actions con­
cerning children, whether undertaken by public or private 
social welfare institutions, courts oflaw, administrative 
authorities or legislative bodies' make 'the best inter­
ests of the child a primary consideration 
and that it had thus given rise to a legitimate expectation, in 
the absence of statutory indications to the contrary, to the ef­
fect that the said provisions of the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child would be taken into account when Australian 
authorities came to consider whether to grant resident status 
and whether to deport Mr Teoh, a Malaysian citizen previous­
ly convicted of drug offences in Australia, from Australia to 
the detriment of his children. 
It is relevant to note in this regard that in its decision in 
Kavanagh v. Governor of Mountjoy Prison
37 the High Court
of Ireland affirmed that the decision in Teoh was only con­
cerned with procedural fairness and that it could not be in­
voked in order to demand the quashing of a conviction by 
the Irish Courts on the basis of a decision of the Human Rights 
Committee established under the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights. In that case the High Court of Ire­
land also held that: 
Even if the Covenant is part of Irish domestic law, the subject 
of international law is the State and not the individual: See 
O'Laighleis (1960) IR at 124. Such matters as are raised by 
the Applicant are not justifiable at the suit of an individual. 
In the United Kingdom the decision in Teoh, founding a 'le­
gitimate expectation on the terms of a treaty was approved 
obiter in R. v. Home Secretary ex parte Ahmed,
38 but H. W.R.
Wade & C. F. Forsyth point out in the eight edition of their Ad­
ministrative Law that the principle has not since been adopted.39
A Possible Maltese Development? 
Can the doctrine of legitimate expectation as outlined above 
adopted by a Maltese Court as a basis for deciding an Admin­
istrative Law case? 
As stated above, the Maltese Courts have been rather in­
clined to apply references to an adaptation of the law of con­
tract where expectations of citizens are frustrated by actions 
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of the Administration but cases may arise where the Courts 
would be confronted with a situation where the public law test 
of 'fairness' would be more appropriate than an adaptation 
of the private law of contract which may be inapplicable in 
casu. Indeed the search for a 'just' solution has also been an 
underlying factor in Maltese decisions and we have had cases 
such as the Mary Grech40 decision where the sole consider­
ation was the application of 'principles of justice' a concept 
much akin to the notion of 'fairness'. 
The affinity between British Common Law and Maltese 
Administrative Law has clearly survived Malta's independence 
even though one can argue that Maltese legislative interven­
tions on judicial review in 19814 1 and in 199542 and the in­
corporation of the European Convention on Human Rights 
into Maltese law long before this was incorporated into British 
law have marked some significant departures. 
In his introduction to Cases in Administrative Law Pro­
fessor Ian Refalo, reviewing the development of Maltese Ad­
ministrative law states that: 
The most important of these developments has been, perhaps, the 
rule that British Common Law is a source of Maltese Administra­
tive Law. The principle has been affirmed in a number of cases; 
what is perhaps even more significant is that there is no case 
where the principle has been rejected or declared not to apply. 
As recently as the 19th November 2001 Mr Justice Filletti in
the judgement of the First Hall of the Civil Court Frank Pace 
et v. Kummissarju tal-Pulizija et stated that: 
fejn l-atti jew azzjonijiet amministrattivi m' humiex regolati 
bil-ligi Maltija, allura r-regoli tad-dritt amministrattiv app­
likabbli jsibu fonti fid-dritt amministrattiv Ing/ii, ara - John
Lowell et nae v. Onor. Clo. Caruana nae, Prim Aw/a tal­
Qorti Civili, 14 ta' Awissu 1972, u Onor. Prim Ministru v. Sr. 
L. Dunkin nae - Qorti Civili, 26 ta' Gunju 1980.
Article 469A of the Code of Organization and Civil Proce­
dure entitles the Courts to: 
enquire into the validity of any administrative act or declare such 
act null, invalid or without effect only in the following cases: 
l(b) 
(ii) when a public authority has failed to observe the prin­
ciples of natural justice or mandatory procedural re-
36 Art. 3 .1 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. 
37 [2001], IEHC 77 (291h June 2001). 
38 
[1999], COD 69 (Lord Woolf MR). 
39 
Footnote 68 at page 498 quoting R v. DPP ex parte Kebilene, [1999], 3 WLR 175 (DC) holding that the ratification of the European 
Convention on Human Rights did not found a legitimate expectation that it would be followed, and R. v. Home Secretary ex parte 
Behluli, [1998], COD 328 holding that there was no legitimate expectation that asylum applicants would be dealt with in accordance 
with the Dublin Convention. Wade and Forsyth also refer to R. v. Uxbridge Magistrates' Court ex parte Adimi which held that asylum 
seekers had a legitimate expectation that they would not be prosecuted for using false documents contrary to Article 31 of the UN Con­
vention Relating to the Status of Refugees. 
40 As at 3 and 6 above. 
41 Act VIII of 1981 .
42 Act XXIV of 1995. 
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quirements in performing the administrative act or in 
its prior deliberations thereon; or 
(iii) when the administrative act constitutes an abuse of the
public authority's power in that it is done for improp­
er purposes or on the basis of irrelevant considera­
tions; or
(iv) when the administrative act is otherwise contrary to
law.
Given that the doctrine of 'legitimate expectation' is about 
extending the protection of the principles of natural justice, 
about preventing the abuse of a public authority's power by 
ensuring that promises are treated as 'relevant considerations' 
and that any exercise of power that is abusive is generally 
considered as an illegality, the article provides a sufficient legal 
basis for the application of the doctrine of legitimate expec­
tation in Maltese law within our system of judicial review. 
10 
This basis in law, authorities and jurisprudence provides 
fertile ground for the development of the doctrine of legitimate 
expectation, already established in the Courts of other coun­
tries with a 'common law' Anglo-American tradition in Ad­
ministrative law such as the United Kingdom,Australia and 
Ireland, in Maltese law. In this regard one must not ignore the 
experience acquired by our Courts in interpreting the Articles 
on the Fundamental Rights and Freedoms of the Individual 
in Chapter IV of the Constitution of Malta, and the European 
Convention on Human Rights. That experience can also en­
able our Courts to make a substantial contribution towards 
defining the extent of review of Administrative acts for 'fair­
ness', in line with the case law of the European Court of 
Human Rights and of the European Court of Justice and with 
the benefit of the discrete Maltese tendency to look at both 
British and Continental ways. 
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